The paper reviews the literature on social capital and development and identifies key properties of this concept that are then used in a model illustrating the potential welfare effects from social capital, in terms of both wellbeing and economic benefits.
Social capital in development studies
The concept of social capital surfaced in the development literature almost simultaneously over the past fifteen years in quite separate places. Ahn and Ostrom (2008) in the Handbook of Social Capital make quite clear the concept has two distinct lines of heritage and associated criticisms: on the one hand the traditional neoclassic economic viewpoint the concept simply refers to the 'cooperation enhancing effects of repeated interactions and networks' and finds the concept essentially redundant (given reputation, trust and networks are all separately defined and rigorously studied already); from the perspective of collective-action theorists and behavioural economists, social capital offers a useful framework for studying the emergence of cooperation. The literature on the evolution of institutions has also used the concept, albeit rather loosely, in the context of informal institutions which play a very significant role in shaping formal institutions and the operation of markets, and can emerge as the preponderant rules of interaction when formal institutions and markets fail. In this context, social capital becomes central because the 'power of an actor' is directly measured by 'the social capital available to the actor within that system, which is ruled by both informal and formal institutions: some actors only have access to primary and non cross-cutting social networks which limit their sphere of action (e.g. poor, low-caste, or women in some contexts), others can access both cross cutting social networks and institutional capital (Casson et al, 2010) .
Coleman is the author who can be credited with expressly introducing the concept of social capital as a key feature of the structures of social action i . He describes social capital both as social organisations and as 'not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common; they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure' (Coleman, 1990, p.302) . These entities in turn comprise obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective sanctions, authority relations, and appropriable social organisations. Social-structural resources can be considered as a capital asset to the individual, in the sense that it is individuals belonging to the structures who can use this form of capital as a productive resource.
In particular, Coleman describes relationships in linear closed systems (i.e. those capable of establishing and maintaining effective norms) in terms of the expectations and obligations that bind each individual to the others. In this context, the social capital available to an individual is simply the sum of all the obligations running towards her from all other individuals. As the fundamental hypothesis is that each individual has some control over the others' actions, the more they are obliged and the higher such control will be. In Coleman's words the 'power of an actor' is 'a direct measure of the social capital available to the actor within that system'.
Coleman describes social capital as a good with a number of properties: it is not completely fungible and, akin to knowledge, it has certain public goods features, generating social returns higher than private ones and, as a consequence, underinvestment on the part of individuals. Intended investment in this construction does in fact not take place, as the self interested individuals on which the theory is based have no interest in producing something the benefits of which accrue to other individuals, so social capital comes about as a by-product of other activities.
Putnam's use of the concept in the context of explaining different regional performances in Italy (Putnam, 1993) has then generated a wide debate regarding both his interpretation of Italian history, his postulated directions of causality (from social capital to institutional performance to economic development), the assumptions regarding the initial distribution and production of social capital, the proxies used to measure it, and ultimately the usefulness of the concept itself. Some writers reject the notion that social networks can be viewed as 'capital' in the traditional sense of yielding returns or of being depleted with use (Ostrom, 1997); Manski (2000) prefers to avoid the use of the term altogether, whilst Mosse thinks that 'The attempt to synthesize the social and the economic in a theory of "social capital" poses questions about the relationship between norms, networks, associations, and collective action, but it also introduces unresolved problems: too many different social phenomena are bundled together, and the statistical concept of social capital is unable to grasp the historical dynamic between collective action, associations, and democratic practice.
As theory, social capital is too vague about the mechanisms by which social interaction produces values or collective action, and as policy its causal relations are too unidirectional (from associations to collective action or democratic process) to be useful (Mosse, 2006, p. 720) .
In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Putnam's definition 'features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions' is perhaps the most widely cited in the development literature (see Table 1 ), and most of social capital proponents in the development literature view it as a useful notion that can help reintroduce the 'social' in the development agenda, and point to its instrumental value in allowing access to resources, especially for the poor (World Bank, 2000) . Grootaert,
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Circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups and networks to secure benefits Source: Della Giusta and Kambhampati (2006)
Levels of social capital
At the micro level, social capital coincides with social networks formed by individuals with intermediaries that facilitate access to human, financial and physical capital. These social networks can be small or large, and include few or many intermediaries of each type. They can also be more or less close, so that for instance an individual may be member of a group which does not include the right type of intermediaries, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum a privileged group may shut other groups out from accessing their intermediaries. It is clear that exclusive loyalty within primary social groups is not per se able to ensure material and immaterial benefits and can sometimes in fact hinder the very possibility, as witnessed by the work on intra-household conflicts and unequal allocation (Schultz, 1990; Pollak, 1994, 2003; Dobbelsteen and Kooreman, 1997; Chen and Woolley, 2001) , by the exclusion at village level of the poorest from group-based microfinance (Rogaly and Roche, 1998; Morduch, 1999 and Paxton et al 2000; Gomez and Santor, 2001 ) and the costs and benefits associated with family-or ethic group based businesses networks (Ben-Porath, 1980; Sivramkrishna and Panigrahi, 2002; Haddad and Maluccio, 2003 Another important feature of trust-based connections is that they display economies of scope, in the sense that trust is based on successful interaction which is mutually beneficial in achieving a specific purpose (for example, accessing finance), but the same connections may be very useful for achieving related purposes (for example, accessing training) but totally unsuited for achieving goals that are widely different from the original (for example, accessing political representation) (see evidence of this in Della Giusta (2004 and ). The result is that specific agency is exercised by different connecting individuals in different fields, as clearly illustrated by Krishna in his Indian study where different agents operate for economic development, for community peace, and for political participation (Krishna, 2002) .
Again, there can be downsides to bridging networks as well, as witnessed by the existence of exploitative and patronage-based relations.
At the macro level, social or institutional capital describes the connection individuals have with institutions and their ability to avail themselves of their services; it thus involves local government institutions that both enable the scaling-up of micro level social capital and actually contribute to creating social capital. Institutions can do this by creating conditions that are favourable to entering and maintaining social networks on the one hand, and through social policy and the attitude they promote in public officials, on the other (see Lam, 1996 and Wade, 1985 (p. 56, 1999) . Perhaps social capital is better understood as an example of irreducibly social good, more similar to culture than public goods provision. Taylor suggests that culture consists of "objects of value which cannot be decomposed into individual occurrences in the sense that they cannot be reduced to a set of acts, choices or other predicates of individuals; individuals cannot by definition possess such goods, rather they are features of societies" (p. 24, 1990) . The difference between social goods and public goods is that public goods are only instrumentally valuable, whereas social goods essentially incorporate common understanding of their value and are irreducible features of society as a whole; in this sense culture as 'common understanding' ii . This then means that social goods can only be produced by a whole society, ruling out the possibility of creating or selecting privileged actors in the process. Access to both networks and institutional capital obviously depend on historically and culturally determined power relations.
The view adopted here is that social capital has both instrumental and intrinsic value, (Della Giusta, 1999 and 2003) . An approach that views social capital as intrinsically valued by individuals as their well being is increased by belonging to social networks is also consistent with the recent literature on happiness and well-being which suggests that social capital (in the form of relationships and trust) is a major factor in explaining differences in happiness (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Layard, 2005; Frey and Stutzer, 2004 
2003)
Empirical studies
There is now a vast empirical micro and macro literature relating indicators of networks density, trust and associationism to economic development (some of the most cited include Miguel et al, 2003 and Grootaert, 1999; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997) , which contains a variety of proxies for social capital indicators. The first macro studies of the latter part of the 1990s were usually relying on data on trust variables and incidence of associations from values and social surveys which were then used as explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions, but recent studies by Miguel and others addressing the link between these proxies and industrialization in Indonesia find that high initial levels of social interaction in a district do not predict subsequent industrialization, and that industrialising areas see higher social networks density developing rather than the other way around. These studies also show that there is an important effect of migration and industrialization in nearby areas, which leaves some areas with declining social networks (Miguel et al, 2006) .
Perhaps more interesting are the results found by micro level studies (as Haddad and
Maluccio 2003, who investigate the effect of networks membership on household welfare), which often devise context specific proxies for trust and networks membership and model the interaction between these and a variety of development outcomes in a more complex way. Krishna (2002) uses data from Indian villages to illustrate the fundamental role of agency in ensuring that members of existing social networks can access a variety of resources, and stresses how the presence or absence of such agency is key to the process of development (in the form of material benefits as well as peace and political participation) through social capital. Cleaver (2005) provides a very useful example of the ways in which the very poorest in Tanzania cannot benefit from social capital, having social networks among other poor people who cannot help them and lacking institutional capital. This study provides also a powerful reminder of the dangers of the frequent conflation within the literature of individual and household, which as stated above is problematic as the household can itself be a source of exclusion for some of its members. Cleaver's study illustrates the situation of women in wealthier households who have however no access to resources and whose position in similar to those of very poor households. Furthermore, by illustrating the interlocking disadvantages experienced by poor households (small family size and weak family networks, lack of assets -including labour power-which constrains their ability to engage in reciprocal collective activities, poor health, inability to articulate in public fora and the derogatory perceptions of other community members towards them), this study highlights the frequently forgotten complementarity between social and other forms of capital: social capital cannot be understood as a ready substitute for other missing capitals (human, natural, financial).
Results highlighting both the role of missing capitals and the complementarity between micro and institutional social capital were obtained in our studies of social capital and microfinance in Mexico (Della Giusta 1999 and Casson and Della Giusta, 2005) and of social capital and the wellbeing of immigrant women in the UK (Della Giusta and Kambhampati, 2006).
Modelling social capital and economic development
The model that follows incorporates insight gained from empirical work, particularly relative to the need for suitable intermediaries and for complementary forms of capital (Fehr et al, 2005) . This literature documents the deviation from self-interested behaviour, the emergence of social norms, and the general economics of reciprocity (Sobel, 2005; Smith, 2003; McCabe et al, 2003; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000) . Using both evidence from psychological studies and social policy, as well as experiments, these studies show how notions of reciprocity inform actors behaviour and how individuals are willing both to punish people who violate norms and incur costs in doing so (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) . There is also evidence which links responses of the brains of actors playing a trust game indicating that trust develops as a response to reciprocity (King-Casas et al, 2005) , which confirms the interpretations of the workings of the brain given in experimental economics (Zak et al, 2005; McCabe et al, 2003) . Similar modelling in the development literature has recently appeared (see Sethi and Somanatan; Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003; Francois, 2002) 
Functioning of the credit system
There initially exist two types of agents in the economy: agents (all identical to each other and denoted with the l subscript), that are endowed with capital and engage in money lending -henceforth moneylenders-, and agents (all identical to each other and denoted with the h subscript), that are endowed with labour (all with the same amount per agent) and reputation (μ) and borrow capital to engage in production. The income generated in production accrues partly to the lenders, through the flow of repayments from repaying borrowers, and the rest is consumed. Agents endowed with reputation can access credit either via individual lending from moneylenders, or through groups lending. Within both credit arrangements each agent endowed with reputation receives a fixed capital loan of size b h , which is renewed upon repayment of interest.
Moneylenders charge a higher interest rate on loans than the nominal interest rate charged in groups lending. Due to joint liability within the latter, however, repaying borrowers must repay for part of the defaulting borrowers, so that the effective interest rate is higher than the nominal whenever default is present. Both types of lenders are assumed to have two different responses to borrower's default, which depend on the reason for defaulting. In particular, they are able to expel only a part (ε 1 ) of voluntary defaulters, and are prepared to help only a part (1-ε 2 ) of involuntary defaulters. Involuntary default takes place when a production shock occurs, thereby impairing repayment. The present construction assumes that ε 1 and ε 2 are identical for both types of lenders, in order to underline only outcomes caused by differences in the lending mechanisms based on a different consideration of borrowers' preferences, rather than based on differing attitudes towards default iii . Re-entering borrowing once reputation has been lost is only possible through local government institutions intervention (for example they are targeted by a special credit programme) iv .
The crucial variables explaining the micro-level social capital dynamics are the repayment rates, and particularly their response to the characteristics of the credit markets (relative magnitude of n, n' and n e ), credit providers' attitude towards default (ε 1 and ε 2 ) and their relationship with the local government institutions' reputations (parameter γ) v . All agents with identical endowments of labour and capital have an identical production function and generate an identical level of income y h , which is used for repayment and consumption. Consumption will then be higher in case of default. Moreover, when default is punished, c h will be higher (being expelled from lending, the borrower will consume the loan vi ) than in the case of unpunished default (involuntary defaulters in both markets lose a part of their production as a result of the shock equal to pb h ). The capital stock in the economy at any time is simply the sum of all loans made to borrowers:
and the depreciation flow is the sum of all loans consumed by punished defaulting members:
Through repayments additions are made to the capital stock, as repayments enable the lenders to make new loans, once deducted their costs (C l ).
Overall, the dynamic of capital in the economy is described by:
where C is total consumption and Y total income.
Repayment implies renewal of the loan and conservation of the borrower's reputation, so that reputation is maintained through repayment or unpunished default, and lost with punishment. The stock of reputations present in the economy at any point in time is simply the sum of all reputations present:
and the depreciation flow is:
The gross investment flow coincides with the repayments flow, so that overall, the dynamic of reputation in the economy is described by:
Borrowers' choice
Borrowers' preferences include both consumption (c h ) and reputation (μ h ), and they face two sets of choices: which type of lending market to enter and, once in it, whether to comply with repayment obligations. Borrowers maximise utility under two dynamic budget constraints: the constraint determined by the availability of reputation ( h μ & ), and the constraint on production determined by the availability of capital ( ).
However, the constraints differ between the two markets, so that two separate maximisations are carried out to describe borrowers' choice in the two cases
Choice in this well known framework derives from dynamic optimisation, but what distinguishes this model is that reputation is a variable with both intrinsic and instrumental value: it is desired per-se (provider of utility) and used to access credit (intervening production factor). The optimisation is therefore carried out considering two control variables, c h and μ h and two state variables μ h and k h (with reputation being both a control and a state variable to reflect its double function). The maximisation yields a relationship between the optimum growth rates of consumption, and of reputation and an expression for the productivity of capital as a function of the consumption to reputation ratio, the rate of capital (and reputation) depreciation, and the ratio of the partial elasticity of utility with respect to reputation over the partial elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. In particular, given that capital productivity coincides with the interest that households are prepared to pay for capital, the interest rate for both individual and group borrowing will increase the higher the proportion of punished defaulters, the lower the ratio of consumption to reputation, and the higher the relative preference given to consumption in utility (please see appendix for derivation of these results).
Lenders' choice
Individual lenders maximise profits choosing a scale of operations (n) so as to maximise the difference between revenues and costs, determining the optimum value for the rate of interest on capital (p*). Let c l be the fixed costs per borrower faced by the lender (these costs include all the activity's costs -screening, monitoring, enforcing-, including the reward to the lender), and n be the size of the individual lending market, so that c l n provides the total fixed costs, pb h qn is the repayments (revenue), and b h (1-q)n[ε 1 (1-ρ)+ε 2 ρ] is the capital lent to punished defaulters, that is the capital losses. If n e n/N is the flow of new borrowers in individual lending, and b h n e n/N are new loans made to the re-introduced borrowers, then profits viii will be given by:
the maximisation of π with respect to n allows one to derive the optimum value for p:
Groups' lending constitutes an alternative mechanism for accessing credit, and is based on the external effect to reputations that exists in groups and that acts as a further incentive to repayment which is absent in individual borrowing. Their financial constraint is that revenues cover costs, and this determines the nominal rate of interest on capital ix (p'*). Due to joint liability, repaying borrowers also repay for unpunished defaulters, so that the individual repayment from each borrower is:
and, if the group lending market size is n', revenues can also be calculated. All other conditions being analogous to those faced by individual lenders, profit is simply the difference between revenues and costs and maximising this yields the interest charged in group lending as:
Equilibrium conditions and results
To achieve equilibrium, three conditions must hold: firstly, for both lending arrangements to exist simultaneously, the marginal and total utility for a borrower must be the same when choosing individual or group borrowing. Secondly, given that there are no differences in the level of technology and in the quantity and quality of labour used by borrowers in production, the productivity of capital must be the same.
Finally, the equilibrium of demand and supply requires that the price borrowers are prepared to pay for capital equals the effective cost of borrowing determined by the prices set by the lenders.
Thus the first condition (simultaneous existence of the two markets) states:
Substituting the Cobb-Douglas utility functions yields:
The presence of the external effect to reputation in groups (μ h' > μ h ) means that:
and:
Note that, further to this, marginal utilities also have to be identical for the equilibrium to be stable, and this produces the same conditions stated in eq.7 and 8 x .
The second equilibrium condition (identical capital productivity) requires that (eq. 9):
And the final equilibrium condition (intersection of demand and supply) requires, substituting the optimum values from the households' and lenders' optimisations in the individual lending market that (eq. 10):
( )
Considering together equations (7), (9) and (10) allows to determine xi the result that the repayment rate in groups lending is higher than in individual lending:
with the actual values of q and q' being determined by equilibrium condition 3.
Note also that if q'>q and ε 1 > ε 2 , from Eq. 10 follows that ρ'< ρ. The economic interpretation of this result is that a higher repayment in groups is associated with a lower exposure to production shocks for households that belong to them (i.e. when a reputation effect is present in a group, this indicates that the group also provides some kind of risk protection for its members).
The study of the equilibrium repayment values q and q' also shows that xii :
1) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the lower the size of the loan relative to the cost of lending and the higher the share of excluded in the credit market.
2) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the stricter the lenders (ε 1 and ε 2 ).
3) Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the smaller the relative preference given to consumption in utility, and the higher the equilibrium consumption/reputation ratio.
Extensions

Modelling of the reputation effect in groups
It is interesting to further analyse the reputation effect in groups, particularly since an ongoing issue in the microfinance literature regards the determination of optimum values for group size (m'*), considering at least some of the more controversial issues associated with social capital; most notably, the existence of potential negative sides at the level of the group, that have also been argued to have effects that propagate to the whole system. In order to describe explicitly the reputation effect in groups, the existence of group sizes for which such effect is decreasing, and even potentially negative must be therefore taken into account. A possible way for explicitly modelling the external reputation effect is to consider it as a function of its most likely determinants: group's size per se (the larger the size, the lesser the cohesion of the group), and weighted with repayment (the higher, the higher the more the group can get large before negative effects set it) and with diffusion of group lending (again the higher, the more the group can get large before negative effects set in).
If the effect takes the following form: 
The corresponding level of external effect can be derived and calculated at the individual level as well, to enable comparisons of utility for different group structures.
Extension to individual lending
The same idea can be applied to the individual lending market, in this case to determine the minimum size for a lender. If entry in this sector faces a barrier determined by a reputation endowment (where the reputation of a lender is simply the sum of the reputations of its repaying clients), then such barrier could again be described in terms of some proportion of the level of borrowers' repayment rate 
Conclusions
Several implications derive from the model's results: 1) Lending mechanisms based on social collateral (reputation effects) achieve higher repayment among their borrowers even when they have the same attitude towards default as individual profit-maximising lenders.
2) More borrowers can access credit (and therefore have higher income) with lending based on social collateral, than with individual lending.
3) The more the government shelters borrowers from shocks, the higher the compliance rates and the higher the number of borrowers that can access credit.
4) Social capital in the system is the sum of reputations, therefore it increases with diffusion of group lending together with government help.
The results of the model are supported by the literature on microfinance, particularly the relationship between successful microfinance institutions and complementary development institutions and governments xiv . The case for reputations being sufficient (and direct sanctions not being necessary) is in contrast with much of the literature on lending to governments and reputation (see the classic study by Bulow and Rogoff, 1989) , however, note that the present model would also yield the same result if reputation was not intrinsically valued (that is if it was not a provider of utilty independent of its instrumental valued) xv .
The most relevant implications from the model are those relating to the relationship between social capital and development, and particularly the importance of the existence of socially-based intermediaries in making possible access to markets for the poor, the importance of government investment both in direct support of borrowers' livelihoods, and in the social subsidy that they can provide as guarantors of individual reputations if public officials are themselves respected and maintain a credible reputation by delivering public services efficiently.
and substitution in the fourth yields: 
Hamiltonian: 
where:
Re-arranging and dividing by q yields:
that can be substituted in the first equation to obtain:
that can be expressed as:
Now recall that:
which means that the right hand side is positive, and observes the condition for the prices charged by group lenders to be positive:
a' > (1-q')e' which implies that the term in square brackets on the left hand side is positive. The final implication is therefore that:
q' > q.
Study of the equilibrium values q* and q'*
The following study is carried out only for q*, but it applies to q'* as well.
Equilibrium condition 3 produces an equation of second order. For its solutions to exist, the following condition must hold on the equation's delta: Repayment equilibrium rate is higher the stricter the lenders (ε 1 and ε 2 ) and, given that it is hypothesised that voluntary default is punished more than involuntary default (ε 1 > ε 2 ), this also implies that ρ'< ρ. The repayment equilibrium rate is higher the smaller the relative preference given to consumption in utility, and the higher the equilibrium consumption/reputation ratio.
i Although he credits the definition to Loury, who defined it as the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organisation and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person (Loury, 1977) . ii On irreducibly social goods see again Sen' entitlement approach (1981) and a useful critique by Gore (1997) .
iii Thus for the individual lending market there will be qn repaying borrowers, (1-q)n defaulting borrowers, (1-q)[ε 1 (1-ρ)+ε 2 ρ] defaulting borrowers punished by moneylender with loss of reputation and non renewal of loan, and (1-q)[(1-ε 1 )(1-ρ)+(1-ε 2 )ρ] defaulting borrowers that are not punished by moneylender. For the groups lending market, analogously, there will be q'n' repaying borrowers, (1-q')n' defaulting borrowers, (1-q')[ε 1 (1-ρ')+ε 2 ρ'] defaulting borrowers punished with loss reputation and non renewal of loan, and (1-q')[(1-ε 1 )(1-ρ')+(1-ε 2 )ρ'] defaulting borrowers that are not punished.
iv Thus if N = n e +n +n' is the population, n e are agents outside the credit market, γ = n e (n + n')/N= is the share of agents outside the credit markets that are supplied with reputation by the local gov. institutions in order to enter them, n e n/N are agents supplied with reputation by the local gov. institutions that re-enter individual lending market and n e n'/N are agents supplied with reputation by the local gov. institutions that re-enter groups lending market. The dynamic of n e will therefore follow the expression . might certainly be assumed in the case in the context of a country borrowing on the international financial markets, but in the present case it would mean making a completely different set of assumptions concerning individual's behaviour, which would of course alter all the results from the model.
